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In this paper, I deal with the constructive and dynamic nature of memory formation and with the nature of memory be-
lief, whether a memory belief refl ects the real past experience or a modifi ed memory representation. That is I grapple 
with the issue of whether such a belief adheres to the fi nal stage of memory or refl ects the whole constructive process of 
memory. After examining the multiple-trace and reconsolidation theories of memory, I conclude that recent fi ndings in 
neuroscience fundamentally disturb conventional notions of memory belief, since beliefs do not refl ect the reconstructive 
processes episodic and autobiographical memories go through. 
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INTRODUCTION
Neuroscientists have recently shown that 
memory, especially autobiographical memory, 
is a dynamic entity that perpetually changes. 
Autobiographical memories are vulnerable to 
multiple infl uences and prone to distortions and 
deceptions; they are never constant and never 
result in fully accurate representations. At the 
same time, however, these changes occur with-
out us being aware of them. Even so, we still 
attribute belief to memories and view them as 
accurate representations of our past.
In what follows, I examine this puzzle, focus-
ing on the process and formation of episodic and 
autobiographical memory and the nature of its 
beliefs. As I focus on the formation of memory 
belief, I do not deal with belief’s propositional 
dimension. Thus, this discussion will not be 
embedded in the philosophical framework of 
propositional attitude, but instead in frameworks 
conceptualizing how belief relates to processes 
of constructing and modifying memories. I ex-
amine whether belief formation as it appears 
emerges from the underlying mechanisms of 
memory formation. If our memories beliefs 
do indeed depend on the processes of memory 
formation that perpetually alter these memo-
ries, what then is the epistemological status of 
such beliefs? How is belief sustained? Are be-
liefs modifi ed together with their corresponding 
memory representations?
Thus, I am interested in whether memory and 
memory-belief formation are distinct. I work to 
determine whether memory beliefs go through 
the same modifi cations as memory representa-
tions, or whether beliefs join memories only in 
the last stage when memories are already formed. 
Given that, in most cases, we are not aware of 
the changes to memories, a further question be-
comes whether earlier manifestations of a given 
belief are also expunged as this belief undergoes 
continual change. Tackling these questions will 
help determine whether autobiographical memo-
ries are inherently joined by the misleading be-
lief that they represent the past as it was, even 
when these representations have undergone mul-
tiple modifi cations. 
Neuroscience has found that memory serves 
as a generative, reconstructive, and dynamic en-
tity. Memory is not a literal reproduction of the 
past, but instead an ongoing constructive pro-
cess. Memories are modifi ed and reconstruct-
ed repeatedly. Cognitive psychologists, who 
deal with memory, investigate how memory is 
formed, reconstructed and modifi ed, and in what 
way it conforms to past experiences. These psy-
chologists presume that memory’s function is to 
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adapt and adjust us to new circumstances, and, 
as a result, tends to fail in reproducing reality. 
For these reasons, memory often contains errors, 
inaccuracy, distortions, and gaps. Following the 
cognitive psychologists’ postulation that memo-
ry is a constructive process, scholars of neuro-
biological memory formation theories, which 
examine the underlying neural mechanisms of 
memory, support the dynamic and fl exible char-
acterization of memory construction at the neu-
robiological level. Two central theories explain 
the constructive nature of memory, Multiple-
Trace Theory and Reconsolidation Theory.
MULTIPLE-TRACE THEORY (MTT)
Current models assume that separate process-
es encode an initial experience, and that no sin-
gle anatomical location contains the entire repre-
sentation of a specifi c memory. Instead, the fea-
tures of a memory are spread out and distributed 
over many locations. According to these models, 
components of memory representation are dis-
tributed widely across different parts of the brain 
as mediated by multiple neocortical circuits. 
Each circuit handles a distinct component of the 
original experience such as the visual, auditory, 
taste, tactual, and motor sensations. Researchers 
assume that the integration of these components 
takes place within the medial temporal regions. 
For instance, Schacter (1996, p. 87) writes:
“the medial temporal region contains instructions 
that specify how to assemble the puzzle; eventually, 
the instructions are shifted over to cortical regions 
that contain all the component pieces of the puzzle”
Phenomenologically, remembering appears to 
the observer as a unifi ed experience — just as 
perception itself appears unitary — but, in fact, 
each experience is sustained by multiple neu-
ral cognitive systems. Morris Moscovitch, who 
maintains that the retrieval process is much 
more crucial than the other phases, clarifi es the 
process of memory recovery with reference to 
fi nding a book in the library. Moscovitch (2007, 
p.19) writes:
“While the whole book is located in a specifi c place 
and picking the book is picking all that is included 
in it, retrieval process is more like assembling the 
pages of a book which may be scattered in different 
locations in the library. Finally, unlike a call num-
ber which is distinct from the book itself, retrieval 
cues and processes interact with the engram and 
infl uence the memory which is recovered. Depend-
ing on the interaction, some ‘pages’ of the memory 
may be missing, others may be placed in the wrong 
sequence, still others may be imported from other 
books which are related in some way to the cues and 
the engrams, and some of the cues themselves may 
be incorporated into the memory that is recovered 
and change the engram on which it was based”
Retrieval of a past experience involves assem-
bling scattered memory features from different 
neuronal locations. This assembling, accord-
ing to neuroscientists, is not a simple process 
in which all the pertained features obey at the 
time of retrieval to form an exact representation 
of past occurrence. Rather, retrieval is a process 
in which features from the original memory are 
omitted or lost, and features from other, associat-
ed memories are attached to the retrieved memo-
ry. The interaction between a cue and a memory 
representation can add or eliminate information 
from the encoded engram, import related infor-
mation from other engrams, change the order of 
encoded the information, and so on. Thus, ac-
cording to the MTT, remembering something 
is not like storing a fi le on the computer, which 
remains the same from the moment we closed 
the computer at night to the next morning when 
we open it again. Rather, every time we access a 
memory, we come up with different results.
RECONSOLIDATION THEORY
Memory recovery is not only the integration 
of a retrieval cue with the dissipated components 
of a memory trace, but also has additional as-
pects that determine the subjective recollective 
experience. As neuroscientists have revised con-
solidation theory in line with emerging insights, 
they have come to emphasize the elastic and 
constructive formation of memory. In the past, 
researchers claimed that memory consolida-
tion (the process of memory stabilization) takes 
place only once. According to such accounts, a 
new memory is initially labile but becomes sta-
bilized over time through the process of consoli-
dation. This process converts an unstable short-
term memory into a stable long-term one. These 
researchers believed that, after consolidation, 
memories are stable and resilient to disruption. 
In short, the initial idea among memory research-
ers was that consolidation stabilizes memories in 
a reliable way.
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However, the theory of memory has been rad-
ically changed in the last two decades. Currently, 
neuroscientists, who study neural processes and 
mechanisms of memory persistence (e.g. synap-
tic strength and plasticity), show that consoli-
dation takes place not only after new learning 
(encoding), but also after every recall (memory 
retrieval). During retrieval, consolidated mem-
ories enter a transient state when they become 
labile once again, and require another phase of 
consolidation (known as “reconsolidation”) to 
persist (Nader et al., 2000; Dudai, 2004). These 
neuroscientists claim that memories are always 
in a state of change and constant adjustment, 
since memories are not permanently stored, but 
enter a transient and labile state during every 
retrieval (Dudai, 2002, 2009; see also Alberini, 
2011). Thus, memory retrieval behaves like re-
encoding: the instability of the encoding process 
exists again at the time of memory activation 
(Nadel, 2007). The engram returns to short-term 
active state when memories are vulnerable to 
distortions.a Some neuroscientists who deal with 
reconsolidation theory also maintain that the act 
of retrieval can itself cause amnesia since the 
connections between the synapses underlying 
the trace become weakened. Thus, retrieval by 
itself can actually disrupt an established memory 
trace (Nader, 2003). The susceptibility of mem-
ory to modifi cation during reconsolidation de-
pends on various factors, including the age and 
specifi city of the memory, the strength of initial 
learning, and the strength and number of prior 
reactivations. For example, when the memory 
is weak, it is more susceptible to disruptions, 
and the stronger the reactivation of a memory, 
the more it becomes labile. Due to these fi nd-
ings, neuroscientists have assumed that when 
a memory is reactivated, it must undergo addi-
tional phase of consolidation (known as “recon-
solidation”) to persist. Thus, consolidation takes 
place not only after new learning (encoding), but 
also after every recall (memory retrieval).b The 
molecular mechanism that stabilizes memory is 
thus required after every recall (Silva, 2007).
The functional signifi cance of the labile phase 
of reconsolidation is not fully known. Gener-
ally, researchers assume that the reconsolidation 
process reinforces and sustains the reactivated 
memories (Sara, 2000), allowing new informa-
tion and learning to become associated with al-
ready established and reactivated memories. In-
deed, during reconsolidation, memories do not 
just remain as they were, but change to allow 
the integration of new information (Alberini, 
2005; Tronel et al., 2005). Reconsolidation is 
thus a manifestation of a larger memory updat-
ing mechanism that adapts the reactivated mem-
ory to new circumstances. From neurobiological 
point of view, this adaption mechanism permits 
new experiences and information to modify ex-
isting neuronal connections and networks. This 
mechanism is possible due to the enhanced plas-
ticity of neuronal circuits that encode all or part 
of a memory trace. In this way, plasticity refers 
to inherent ability of the nervous system to adapt 
as a result of learning and new experiences.
Changes in synapses (the fundamental stor-
age unit in the brain) enable reconsolidation 
and adaption. While synapses allow for change 
and modifi cation, they also facilitate storing 
and stability, since synapses convey and main-
tain memory information (Rudy, 2008; see also 
Dudai, 2009). Thus, as John Sutton (2001, p. 
1111-1112) has conceived, the neuroscience of 
memory implies two coexisting but contradic-
tory features: “distinct transient patterns of ac-
tivity, and composite, enduring, but modifi able 
dispositional states” (see also Sutton, 1998). 
Put differently, synaptic fl exibility allows for 
the persistence of lasting impressions on neural 
circuits, while, on the other hand, also enabling 
change and modifi cation.c
Thus, memory recovery is a complex process 
that is not only composed of collecting disparate 
memory traces, but involves integrating them 
with new information and experiences. Memory 
traces are, with use, modifi ed and reconstructed 
as memory retrieval involves a process of revi-
sion, adjusting past memories with new percep-
tions and future anticipations (Dudai, 2009). Ya-
din Dudai (2012, p.234-235) writes:
“Because reactivation of the trace commonly occurs 
in an altered context, it results in newly encoded 
hippocampal traces, which, in turn, bind new traces 
in the neocortex. This results in multiple traces that 
share some or all the information about the initial 
episode”
Integrating new components into the activated 
engram thus forms a new version of the original 
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episodic memory.
Such changes are part of a natural process 
where the memory trace undergoes various mod-
ifi cations that we cannot necessarily consider as 
errors or fabrication, but, rather, stem from nor-
mal brain activity. Multiple-trace Theory and 
Reconsolidation Theory provide a dynamic, con-
structive, and plastic view of the nervous system 
and demonstrates that a memory is not a literal 
reproduction of the past, but instead an ongoing 
constructive process, an adaptive mechanism 
that confl ates past and present. In turn, this neu-
robiological characterization of memory pro-
vides a new framework for rethinking memory. 
If it is true that stored memories are continually 
being revived and revised through normal brain 
activity, this fi nding changes traditional concepts 
of memory representation. It might challenge the 
notion that memory is a source of factual truth 
and, as a result, transform the way we under-
stand memory and remembering. Thus, the neu-
roscience of memory poses new problems and 
raises several questions.
What is the exact epistemological status of 
memories?
If our memories are perpetually modifi ed, does 
this not imply that they are essentially memories 
of memories and re-remembering of remember-
ing, rather than memories of the original per-
ceived experience?
What about a belief that is attached to a memory?
We attribute to memories beliefs and view them 
as accurate representations of our past. Do these 
emerging fi ndings undermine apparently justi-
fi ed memory beliefs?
Do memory beliefs mislead us, having us believe 
that memories accurately represent the past?
MEMORY BELIEF
Neuroscience postulates memory as a mech-
anism composed of multiple systems, forms, 
functions, and processes. The reason that cogni-
tive psychologists divide memory to subsystems 
derives from their inability to arrive at general-
izations that explain all the variety of memory 
types and expressions. Psychologists categorize 
and classify forms of memory according to types 
of knowledge they represent, and also by their 
underlying mechanism, process, function, and 
mode of acquisition. In short, different kinds of 
memory depend on different brain systems and 
correlate with different neural expression.  By 
identifying multiple memory systems, research-
ers hold that different brain areas support dif-
ferent memory systems. As a result, they con-
tend that a memory with one feature, such as 
consciousness, necessarily correlates to specifi c 
brain region such as the hippocampus, whereas a 
memory not associated with awareness relies on 
another area, the basal ganglia and related brain 
structures (Willingham and Goedert, 2001).
Out of the multiple kinds of memory, I focus, 
in what follows, on episodic and especially au-
tobiographical memory, our personal past expe-
riences. Episodic memory formation is relevant 
to other memory systems because all systems 
share common processes like encoding, storing, 
and retrieval. Additionally, different memory 
systems closely interact. However, there are at 
least four reasons to concentrate on episodic 
memory.
First, different kinds of memory behave dif-
ferently. Brain substrates of procedural mem-
ory, the implicit acquisition of non-symbolic 
skills, remain unchanged and relatively perma-
nent over a life cycle. Conversely, the brain sub-
strates of declarative memory which includes 
episodic (personal experiences), and semantic 
memory (factual knowledge about the world, 
concepts, rules, and language) appear to fl uctu-
ate. Episodic memory is even more susceptible 
to manipulation and to various kinds of errors 
than semantic memory (Tulving, 1982).
The second reason concerns the relation of 
memory to veridicality. Memory systems in-
volve different kinds of knowledge. For instance, 
procedural memory does not require awareness 
and stems from accumulated practice and ex-
perience. Thus, issues of truthfulness are not as 
relevant to this type of memory. In contrast, epi-
sodic and semantic systems are declarative and 
propositional, as they are kinds of knowledge 
that can be verifi ed as right or wrong. 
Third, episodic memories are the only ones 
with direct reference to the past. As Tulving 
(1999, p.15) points out:
“episodic memory is the only form of memory that, 
at the time of retrieval, is oriented toward the past: 
retrieval in episodic memory means ‘mental time 
travel’ through and to one’s past. All other forms of 
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memory, including semantic, declarative and proce-
dural memory, are, at retrieval oriented to the pres-
ent”
Moreover, it may appear that procedural memo-
ry is only realized in the present, but is also ori-
ented towards the future. We learn skills to exer-
cise them more effectively in the future.
The forth reason relates to differences be-
tween episodic and semantic memory. Semantic 
memory does not refer to the time or context of 
learning. It does entail truthfulness, but we share 
this knowledge with others. In contrast, episodic 
memory is accompanied by the experience of re-
membering. It identifi es the specifi c time, place, 
and context in which the experience occurred. 
As a result, episodic memory is the only type 
that provides an epistemic authority on our own 
past. However, we are often not in the position 
to defend our memory beliefs, since we cannot 
go back to the past and justify or verify them. 
Even when we do have supporting evidence, it 
does not necessarily validate the belief, even if 
it correlates with our memory. Supporting evi-
dence might seemingly support the current be-
lief, but it is very plausible that this supporting 
evidence itself has already been integrated into 
the memory, infl uencing and constructing a new 
memory belief that still may fail to represent the 
real past occurrence (Price et al., 1936). Thus, 
unconsciously, we integrate apparent support-
ing evidences from the present into a memory 
that change due to natural alterations in perspec-
tive and interpretations. Overall, then, relying on 
present perception-justifi cation might verify the 
modifi ed memory, but not necessarily the origi-
nal experience. Brian Smith (1966) describes 
this complex process of how new perceptions 
are unconsciously integrated into memory. He il-
lustrates how memories have both dynamic and 
transient states in order to show that memories 
are in perpetual state of modifi cation that occurs 
without us noticing these changes or being able 
to compare memories to the original experience:
“Not only is it impossible to compare our memories 
with the events of which they are the memories; but 
because the present is, as it were, always slipping 
away from us into the past we cannot even compare 
our memories with what purport to be the effects of 
the original events (or, more properly, with our in-
ferences from those ‘effects’). For what I am com-
paring must always be, not the memory itself but 
my memory of that memory. Suppose that today I 
remember building, a short while ago, a castle in the 
sand. Tomorrow I go to the beach and there it is. I 
say ‘Yes just as I remembered it yesterday’. But how 
do I then know it is just as I remembered it yester-
day? The sight of the sand castle itself may well in-
fl uence my memory of my previous remembering” 
(Brian Smith, 1966, p.27, italics original)
When current perceptions do not correspond 
to our previous ones, earlier memories adjust 
in light of later encounters. As a result, old 
memories absorb new impressions. Usually, 
earlier memories adjust so quickly that we are 
not aware of the adjustment or even that there 
was an incongruity. Yet even though this adjust-
ment process occurs continually, episodic and 
autobiographical memories are endowed with 
subjective state of awareness that engenders a 
strong belief and a feeling of confi dence in the 
reliability of our memories. However, there is no 
necessary correlation between this confi dence 
and the reliability of the memory. Often, people 
can have high confi dence not only in distorted 
memories, but also in memories of events that 
never happened. Emotional attachment does not 
indicate the veracity of the memory either, since 
people can feel strong attachment to inaccurate 
memories as well (Lynn et al., 1998; see also 
Loftus, 2003). Moreover, when we recollect, we 
are not conscious of these memory reconstruc-
tions. This reconstruction process is inaccessible 
for us even if we dwell deeply on the process of 
recalling, since even refl ection does not neces-
sarily lead to a better understanding of the com-
ponents involved in the process of memory con-
struction. Hence, studying episodic memory can 
give insight into the complex transformations 
that occur in it, enabling us to draw clearer con-
nections between recent fi ndings and the nature 
of memory beliefs.
Neuroscience, then, leads us to the view that 
memories are misattributed with belief. That is, 
neuroscience eliminates the opposition between 
true and false memory beliefs, since all autobi-
ographical memories entail, in sense, false be-
liefs. Recalling is, in some degree, always false-
ly believed, for a given recall is never exactly 
like the original experience and goes through 
various modifi cations without our awareness, so 
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much so that we falsely believe that memories 
represent events exactly the way we experienced 
them. Thus, the integration of additional infor-
mation in autobiographical memories actually 
causes an unjustifi ed belief to become justifi ed. 
Conversely, since memory is a dynamic process, 
no fully justifi ed memory beliefs appear pos-
sible, leading to epistemic skepticism regarding 
most, if not all, episodic memory.
To further examine these distinctions in the 
following, I discuss the various theories of mem-
ory belief and justifi cation, and whether the neu-
roscience of memory implies that initial justifi ed 
memory beliefs are no longer justifi ed, since 
memories are in a perpetual state of adaptation 
and adjustment. The question that follows, then, 
is whether belief adheres to the initial experience 
or to the modifi ed memory. If, as appears to be 
the case, belief is attached to memories in their 
modifi ed form, it becomes unclear whether such 
belief refl ects an awareness of ongoing memory 
modifi cations, or whether this belief does not, it-
self adapting to these very modifi cations.
BELIEF AND JUSTIFICATION
Believing is not necessarily congruent with 
knowing, since one can believe without know-
ing whether a state of affairs is true. One can 
also follow Russell’s thought experiment that 
the world came into being fi ve minutes ago and 
maintain that a memory belief is independent of 
past occurrence. According to Russell, in order 
to account for knowledge of the past, memories 
are accompanied with a feeling of familiarity and 
belief. Consequently, we would count both false 
and true memory beliefs as memories so long 
as they were accompanied with such feelings. 
Therefore, according to Russell, an imagina-
tion–image accompanied by a feeling of famil-
iarity and belief will be regarded as a memory. 
In short, according to Russell, memory beliefs 
do not necessarily entail relying on past experi-
ences.
Likewise, according to the foundationalist the-
ory of memory-belief justifi cation, the reason for 
regarding a memory as a memory is determined 
by the justifi cation one had when the belief was 
originally formed (Schroer, 2008), the justifi -
cation depending on the initial circumstances. 
Therefore, according to this theory, an appar-
ent memory belief is justifi ed (even if it is not 
actual). Another version of the foundationalist 
theory — the preservation theory — claims that 
memory contains a generative capacity for jus-
tifi cation that, unlike perception, also functions 
to preserve these very justifi cations (Audi, 1995, 
1998; Schroer, 2008). Put differently, memory 
does not generate new justifi cations for a belief, 
but merely preserves such justifi cations. Thus, 
the initial formation of a memory determines the 
justifi cation for a memory belief and, from then 
on, is preserved. That is, a memory belief is not 
changed during an interval from t1 to t2, since 
the belief associated with a memory is sustained 
from the initial formation to the later recall.
There are several reservations to make regard-
ing both the foundationalist theory and the pres-
ervation theory. The foundationalist theory, like 
Russell’s approach, implies that an initial false 
and unjustifi ed belief will be counted as a justi-
fi ed belief, since an apparent memory is justi-
fi ed as a memory belief regardless of whether 
this belief is actually justifi ed. Michael Huemer 
has forwarded a dualistic theory that accommo-
dates to and improves upon the foundational and 
the preservation theories. The dualistic theory, 
he claims, avoids the implications of unjustifi ed 
belief (as in Russell’s hypothesis that the world 
sprang into being fi ve minutesage). Huemer 
(1999) maintains that every belief encompasses 
two degrees of justifi cation: a justifi cation that 
involves the initial formation or adoption of the 
belief and a justifi cation that is involved in re-
tention. He claims that the dualistic theory thus 
succeeds in maintaining both justifi cations: the 
initial justifi cation at acquisition and the justifi -
cation present at the time of recalling. He con-
ceives the “normal functioning of memory” as a 
state that both constitute and retain an acceptable 
and rational memory belief. He rules out the pos-
sibility that a memory belief constitutes a ratio-
nal belief on an irrational basis, “since a rational 
belief, in the full sense, requires both rational ac-
quisition and rational retention” (Huemer, 1999, 
p.351). However, Huemer’s theory also has its 
shortcomings. First, it fails to explicate the con-
ditions under which an initial irrational belief 
will not become a rational belief. Second, in 
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his answer to Russell’s fi ve minutes hypothesis, 
Huemer states that when a mental act appears to 
us as an act of memory, a memory belief then 
serves as justifi ed. However, the acquisition, re-
tention, and retrieval of a belief are not identical 
and static processes. Neuroscience shows that 
memory can convert unjustifi ed belief to justi-
fi ed belief and conversely justifi ed belief to un-
justifi ed belief. In addition, neuroscience casts 
doubt on memory as both a belief-generating 
and belief-preservation process, for it shows 
how processes of memory and belief formation 
are both dynamic. For example, the theory of ep-
isodic memory challenges the preservation the-
ory, since episodic memory and attached beliefs 
are modifi ed over time. Likewise, according to 
emerging fi ndings in neuroscience, we might 
believe one thing at t1 and different thing at t2, 
as the passage of the time unconsciously trans-
forms a memory and, as a result, beliefs. Beliefs 
retained from an earlier experience do not neces-
sarily go through the same adaption process as 
memories and, if they do, we are not aware of 
this process.
Thus, these fi ndings challenge foundationalist 
theories since, even if a belief is justifi ed in the 
past, this initial belief does not guarantee that the 
current belief is justifi ed since the memory itself 
went through a series of unconscious modifi ca-
tions. That is, if the belief is itself adjusted to 
correspond with memory’s current content, this 
belief no longer represents the original memory, 
but instead the new modifi ed memory. Put differ-
ently, this new belief no longer corresponds with 
the original memory belief, but with the modi-
fi ed memory, since this belief is itself involved 
in the same reconstructive process as memory. 
Another attempt to justify memory belief is 
inferential. According to this account, if my ex-
pectations about a memory are fulfi lled at recall, 
the related memory is justifi ed. The fulfi llment 
of expectations, according to Huemer (1999), 
confi rms that a given representation was based 
on memory and that this memory was reliable. 
However, this inferential account disregards the 
natural process of incorporating expectations 
into episodic memories at the time of recalling. 
Episodic memory is formed, modifi ed, and ad-
justed according to current circumstances, ex-
pectations, and anticipations. At the time of re-
calling, episodic memories are changed by inter-
nalizing expectations and anticipations regard-
ing the future. Thus, since memories internalize 
expectations and anticipations, we generally feel 
that our expectations are fulfi lled even if they 
are not. Fulfi llment might come about due to the 
modifi cation process itself in order to adjust the 
past to the present and to what we expect in the 
future. Because we are not aware of the revision 
process, we falsely perceive during recall that 
our current mental state is exactly that of past 
recollections. Therefore, we falsely perceive that 
our expectations are fulfi lled, instead of perceiv-
ing that representations of the past are adjusted 
to current expectations. 
The inferential argument thus ignores the re-
vision that takes place unconsciously and leads 
us to problematically connect the current mem-
ory to the past instead of connecting it to more 
relevant states, especially the present and future. 
Fulfi lled expectations, then, do not necessarily 
prove that a given set of knowledge has its basis 
in accurate memories, since such expectations 
may rely on imaginary functions such as sup-
position, or on new information integrated into 
memory. Moreover, there are also cases when 
our expectations are not fulfi lled even when a 
memory retains a correct picture of a past event. 
In this way, expectation does not appear to serve 
as a suffi cient criterion of reliability. 
Another attempt to justify memory belief is 
through coherentism. According to coherent-
ism, a given memory belief is justifi ed by other 
apparent memory beliefs. If a memory belief is 
consistent with the general belief system, and 
if the various details of the individual memory 
cohere with the general sense of belief, then, 
according to coherentism, this memory is justi-
fi ed. However, this theory, like others, fails to 
account for the dynamic formation of episodic 
memories. Memories change perpetually, in-
corporating other details and accommodating to 
other changes. The reconstructive process might 
cause a true memory belief to be modifi ed and 
become a false memory belief in order to cohere 
with other inaccurate memory beliefs. Thus, co-
herentism contains similar shortcomings to other 
theories attempting to justify memory belief. In 
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sum, philosophers have often discussed original 
memory belief, belief maintenance, and belief 
system confl icts. However, they have largely 
overlooked the dynamic character of memory, 
how it undergoes changes every time retrieval 
occurs and how the very way memory is struc-
tured leads to unjustifi ed memory beliefs. As a 
consequence, recent fi ndings in neuroscience 
have undermined the epistemological status not 
only of memories, but also of beliefs that consti-
tute the subjective conviction about the truth of 
memories. Memory modifi cation itself disquali-
fi es belief from providing suffi cient evidence to 
establish the veridicality of a given memory.
BELIEF REFLECTING THE PRESENT 
RATHER THAN THE PAST
To understand the misleading dimensions of 
memories, we also need to understand the pro-
cesses and functions of beliefs and the relation 
between memory and belief. A central question 
is whether a belief does or does not undergo the 
unconscious process of construction. If yes, the 
question is whether belief and memory would 
be linked only at the time of recalling, when a 
memory attains conscious form. If the fusion 
of memory and belief takes place only at the 
time of recall, these two cognitive processes are 
likely separate, and have distinct epistemologi-
cal realms. In this case, belief does not refl ect 
the real status of autobiographical memories. 
However, if belief is also modifi ed like memory, 
the question becomes whether belief refl ects the 
process of modifi cation or whether it eliminates 
traces from previous phases. If a memory belief 
refl ects the various modifi cations of a memory, 
this modifi cation process may then cause mul-
tiple and possibly contradicting representations. 
If, however, a current belief eliminates its previ-
ous phases, it does not matter whether a belief 
follows the process of change or if it appears 
only at the last stage after the memory is already 
formed. In this sense, the ordinal character is not 
important: whether a given belief is joined at the 
last conscious phase or whether this belief con-
tinually exists (but eliminates previous phases), 
since it represents only the current state in both 
cases. Our belief refl ects the present memory 
with all associated information added during 
reconstruction, possibly creating a discrepancy 
between a belief and the past.
The conclusion here is that belief does not 
have bearing on our real past, but does on the 
current memory representation. That is, memory 
representation misleads us when they are ac-
companied by the belief that knowledge on our 
own past is as it happened, when, in fact, this 
knowledge contains many components, only one 
of which is the past event as experienced. The 
previous belief is no longer readily available, be-
ing replaced by a new belief. We do not track 
the previous beliefs and relevant modifi cation 
processes, just as we do not track such factors 
for specifi c autobiographical memory. The epis-
temic problem lies in the discrepancy between 
memories and their corresponding beliefs. If a 
set of memories change and applicable beliefs 
do not refl ect this change, an epistemic problem 
emerges that renders these beliefs as unjustifi ed. 
If we are not aware of the real states of memory 
formation and modifi cation, we constitute be-
liefs from a position of ignorance as the beliefs 
become false. This raises the question whether 
such confusion simply stems from the fact that 
we do not know that memory fails to represent 
the past (and instead represents the present). If 
so, memory belief might become justifi ed if we 
attribute it not to the past but to the present.
MISCONCEPTION OF MEMORY
This leads to further questions about prevail-
ing misconceptions of memory. Although it has 
been several decades since researchers have un-
covered the dynamic character of memory, and 
the view that memory is reconstructive is not 
new,d the prevailing idea regarding memories is 
that they are stored changelessly and permanent-
ly and that remembering is accurate. The cer-
tainty that we feel regarding our memories does 
not correspond to the real state of our memories. 
What causes this discrepancy between the neu-
roscientifi c view of the reconstructive nature of 
memory and the layman’s spontaneous concep-
tion of memory as an accurate representation of 
the past? Are we deluded by a wrong concept 
of memory? If the answer is yes, another ques-
tion follows — is it the beliefs accompanying 
our memories that deceive us, or, conversely, 
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our false concepts of memory which are at fault? 
Does memory itself play us false, or is our con-
cept of memory what is problematic? If we be-
come aware that remembering is a complex pro-
cess that involves various components, only one 
of which is the past event itself, will we experi-
ence our memories in a different way?
It seems that being aware of the dynamic na-
ture of memory will not necessarily change the 
way we experience memory. After all, it may be 
that memory persistence or readjustment cause 
this faulty belief. Readjustment takes place 
without conscious awareness as it reorganizes 
our memory coherently and leaves us with the 
feeling that the representation is faithful and 
accurate. Changes are inaccessible to us unless 
we take an exact record of our activities as, for 
example, neuro- and cognitive psychologists do 
in experiments. Readjustments reorganize our 
memory coherently and leave us with the feeling 
that the representation is faithful and accurate. 
Memory and belief are not separated, but unifi ed 
in one process. The feeling of unity and coheren-
cy is important for maintaining a coherent sense 
of self, and, conversely, cognitive dissonance 
may arise when belief and memory of a past 
event diverge. Hence, it seems that becoming 
aware of the dynamic nature of memory will not 
itself change the way we experience memory.
FUNCTIONS:
THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT
As stated, neuroscientifi c theories of memory 
provide a framework for rethinking memory. 
This framework suggests that we should shift 
our attitude of episodic and autobiographical 
memory away from broadly epistemological to-
wards being functional. The fact that memory in-
volves a constructive process of piecing together 
fragmentary information (rather than something 
more akin to a direct replay of the past) raises 
the hypothesis that a veridical representation of 
the past is not the optimal functioning of human 
memory system. This raises further questions 
about whether memory may have other roles 
as well. Does memory’s fl exibility give us ben-
efi ts at the expense of accuracy and trustfulness? 
What is the function of memory if it does not 
store and retrieve exact experiential replicas?
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Accuracy is far from the only functional goal 
of memory. Recollecting meets other needs, 
such as reconstructing the past in a desirable 
way, fostering self-consistency, and remember-
ing information so as to give a good impression 
in social settings. The reconstructive mecha-
nism of episodic memory fulfi lls such needs. 
Researchers who grappled with this issue have 
proposed various reasons why human memory, 
in contrast to video recorders or computers, does 
not store and retrieve exact replicas of experi-
ence (Schacter, 2001; Squire, 1998). One infl u-
ential hypothesis suggests, as mentioned above, 
that episodic and autobiographical memories re-
construct past experiences for present purposes 
and that memory distortions refl ect the operation 
of adaptive processes. Indeed, neuroscientists 
do not refer to memory distortions in healthy 
people as weakness or failures of the system, but 
as byproducts of a more adaptive evolutionary 
mechanism. This byproduct refl ects a tradeoff 
between the ability to, on the one hand, accurate-
ly represent the past and to, on the other, adapt 
and adjust memories to new circumstances. We 
forget and distort our memories in order to adapt 
and adjust to the changing world. In fact, in a 
constantly changing environment, literal recall 
is signifi cantly less important than the need for 
one’s memory system to reorganize, revise, and 
modify memories to conform to current beliefs, 
attitudes, and emotional needs (Dudai, 2006).
However, adapting the past to the present is 
not the only function newly ascribed to memory. 
Researchers have shown that memory is not only 
about the past, but is also about the future. Indeed, 
while memory serves as the ability to recall pre-
vious experiences, recall itself is not solely di-
rected toward the past, but is guided by the pres-
ent for the service of the future. Thus, current 
hypotheses suggest that constructive processes 
allow individuals to simulate and imagine fu-
ture episodes, happenings, and scenarios. Since 
the future is not an exact repetition of the past, 
simulation of future episodes requires a complex 
system that can draw on the past in a manner 
that fl exibly extracts and recombines elements 
of previous experiences — a constructive rather 
than a reproductive system. Episodic memory is 
such a system, allowing for other elements to be 
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Endnotes
a: The state of the trace determines its vulnerability. The 
premise here is that memories in an inactive state are less 
vulnerable to disruptions than memories in active state. 
However, this assumption generates controversy, espe-
cially on whether inactive memories truly are less suscep-
tible for intervention and only the active state of the trace 
is vulnerable.
b: Researchers examined the effects of protein synthe-
sis inhibitors after memory reactivation (Alberini, 2005; 
Sweatt, 2007).
c: There are disagreements whether the original memory 
is lost or changed through reactivation, and whether re-
consolidation brings about new memory, or only a modifi -
cation of the original memory (Ledoux, 2007).
d: Bartlett introduces the idea that memory is a recon-
structive process (See Bartlett,1932; Neisser, 1976).
integrated and these complex combinations to 
emerge. Thomas Suddendorf and Michael Cor-
ballis (2007, p. 301-302) write:
“The fact that episodic memory is fragmentary and 
fragile suggests that its adaptiveness may derive less 
from its role as an accurate record of personal his-
tory than from providing a “vocabulary” from which 
to construct planned future events (and perhaps to 
embellish events of the past). It may be part of a 
more general toolbox that allowed us to escape from 
the present and develop foresight, and perhaps cre-
ate a sense of personal identity. Indeed, our ability to 
revisit the past may be only a design feature of our 
ability to conceive of the future”
And, more specifi cally, Conway (2001) main-
tains that episodic memories preserve infor-
mation highly relevant to motives, outcomes, 
evaluations, plan execution, and goal process-
ing. Episodic memories are integrated into auto-
biographical memory because of their relevance 
to longer-term goals, and, consequently, to the 
future (Conway, 2009). Alternatively, the pro-
cess of forgetting occurs because of the non-rel-
evance of these memories to future goals. Auto-
biographical memories function to ground and 
harmonize memories of past experiences with a 
coherent sense of self.
Also, although representations of traumatic 
events (such as fl ashbulb memories) are not 
wholly immune to error and distortion, evidence 
suggests that negative and stressful experiences 
lead to a reduction of the structural plasticity 
(Markowitch, and Welzer, 2005). This may sup-
port the idea that the normal function of memory 
is to form constructive, plastic memories since, 
in cases of traumatic memories, the memory 
system as a whole loses plasticity and is, as a 
result, far less effi cient. If our memories would 
not be modifi ed according to the present or pro-
spective future, a discrepancy would emerge. If 
memories were to represent the past exactly, rep-
resentation of the past would not let us absorb 
changes. Since the present itself is in perpetual 
change, the memory of the past must have the 
same dynamic nature.
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